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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between mone-
tary policies pursued by three major central banks
(U.S. Federal Reserve, European Central Bank and
Bank of Japan) and net equity capital flows to emer-
ging markets (EMs) by global investment funds. We
focus on two aspects of central bank policy: The growth
of central bank assets and the surprise element of asset
growth. We find, first, positive, economically large and
statistically significant spillovers from the U.S. Federal
Reserve asset growth to EM equity inflows following
the adoption of unconventional monetary policies.
Second, U.S. Federal Reserve and (to a lesser extent)
European Central Bank asset growth surprises are ne-
gatively related to EM capital flows.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
This study investigates the effects of unconventional monetary policy (UMP) by the major
central banks on international capital flows. In particular, it focuses on the response of net
equity flows by global investment funds to emerging markets (EMs) to the monetary policies
undertaken by the Federal Reserve (Fed), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of
Japan (BoJ). Motivation for this study comes from the fact that emerging economies have taken
steps to liberalize their capital account during the past two decades and have become more fully
integrated into international financial markets and, thus, able to attract increasing amounts of
private international capital (Wang & Shih, 2013; Hillier & Loncan, 2019; Kiviaho et al., 2014).
Since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, there has been a surge in capital flows to
EMs (see e.g., Ghosh et al., 2014, 2017; Li et al., 2018). In the aftermath of the crisis, the level of
policy interest rates reached the zero lower bound (ZLB) in developed markets and forced
central banks to resort to UMP, which, in turn, affected the dynamics of international capital
flows into emerging economies (Ahmed & Zlate, 2014; Chari et al., 2020).1 This extraordinary
environment of ZLB on interest rates elicited increased interest in examining the determinants
and consequences of these capital flows, including the international spillover effects of UMP.
The existing literature on the determinants of capital flows to EMs distinguishes be-
tween two groups of factors, namely, global (push) and local (pull) factors. Pull factors are
country‐specific variables such as macroeconomic fundamentals and policy‐related char-
acteristics. Push factors are related to general global conditions that capture the economic
climate for investment in emerging economies and are generally outside the control of these
economies (e.g., global liquidity, global risk, etc.).2 Besides push and pull factors, some
studies include contagion as an additional set of variables that determine international
capital flows (e.g., Forbes & Warnock, 2012; Li et al., 2018). In particular, Forbes and
Warnock (2012) identify three variables that capture contagion effects: Trade linkages,
financial linkages and geographic proximity.
One important theme of the recent literature is that a key determinant of capital flows to
EMs is a ‘global financial cycle’, described as co‐movements in gross capital flows, credit
conditions and asset prices across countries (see, Anaya et al., 2017; Rey, 2015). Furthermore,
the main driver of the ‘global financial cycle’ is U.S. monetary policy. There has been a lot of
discussion in the literature about the effect of UMP on global capital flows. The main argument
put forward is that by boosting global liquidity, UMP undertaken by the main central banks in
the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC), has spilled over into capital flows, especially to
EMs that have offered higher returns to global investors. On the contrary, following the an-
nouncement by the Fed of its intention to reduce the size of its balance sheet (assets) in 2013
(the ‘taper tantrum’), it is claimed that the flow of equity capital to EMs by the private financial
sector declined. The claimed link between UMP and equity capital flows to EMs has received
substantial attention in the financial press (see e.g., Financial Times: Wheatley & Kynge, 2016;
Wheatley, 2021)3 and the recent academic literature (Chari et al., 2020; Dahlhaus &
Vasishtha, 2020). The increase in global liquidity resulting from UMP by the major central
1
For a more comprehensive discussion on UMP in the global low‐interest‐rate environment, see Wu and Xia (2016) and Wu and Zhang (2019).
2
It is not our intention to review push/pull factors here; a comprehensive overview is provided in Ghosh et al. (2014, 2017) and Li et al. (2018).
3
These are amongst a plethora of articles in the global financial press on this issue. The latter article points out that spillovers into EM capital flows experienced
in the earlier episodes of unconventional monetary policy, following the global financial crisis, are being repeated during the current cycle of central bank asset




banks and potential spillovers into net equity capital flows to EMs is one of the major issues
tackled in this paper.
The majority of the existing literature is centred on Fed monetary policy (e.g., Chari
et al., 2020; Dahlhaus & Vasishtha, 2020; Gamboa‐Estrada, 2020; Koepke, 2018), whereas
evidence from other major central banks is limited despite their important role in the global
financial cycle (Chari et al., 2020; Dilts‐Stedman, 2019; Fratzscher et al., 2016). We fill this gap
by analyzing the impact of monetary policies of two other major central banks in addition to
Fed, namely, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ). Our measure of
UMP is the growth of each central bank's assets, a measure that reflects the growing im-
portance of quantitative easing (QE) operations undertaken by central banks following the
onset of the global financial crisis. Thus, the first issue examined in this paper is the extent to
which UMP undertaken by the three major central banks (Fed, ECB and BoJ) has spilled over
into increased equity flows to EMs. Though changes in central bank assets may reflect UMP
within the ZLB environment, we recognize that they may also reflect changes in policy interest
rates, or what can be termed ‘conventional’ monetary policy. In this paper, we disentangle the
effects of changes in the policy interest rate on central bank asset growth to arrive at a measure
of central bank asset growth that is net of the effects of changes in the policy rate.
Several studies adopt an expectations perspective to examine how monetary policy expecta-
tions are transmitted to EM capital flows (Chari et al., 2020; Koepke, 2018). Their main finding is
that the surprise element to monetary policy is an important factor in explaining portfolio capital
flows to EMs. Chari et al. (2020) investigate how monetary policy surprises around Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) meetings (utilizing Fed Funds futures data) are related to capital
flows from the U.S. to EMs. They find that Fed quantitative easing was a relevant factor in
explaining capital flows, but the effects differed across episodes of quantitative easing. Koepke
(2018) focuses on changes in monetary policy expectations (derived from federal funds futures
contracts) and their link to capital flows dynamics and concludes that the surprise element of
monetary policy is an important explanatory factor for portfolio capital flows to EMs. Thus, the
second issue examined in this paper is the reaction of global investors to surprises or innovations
to changes in central bank assets and how that is reflected in equity capital flows to EMs. We
surmise that investors treat greater surprises to central bank asset growth as increasing monetary
policy uncertainty and this will have a dampening effect on net capital flows.
The third issue addressed in this paper examines whether capital flows across geographic
regions respond differently to central bank policy. Recent studies have shown that the dy-
namics of capital flows into EMs exhibit strong regional differences. Bathia et al. (2020)
document an important heterogeneous pattern of equity flows across EM geographic regions.
Gamboa‐Estrada (2020) shows that capital flows to EMs increased substantially during Fed
UMP, especially to emerging Asia. Capital flows to emerging Europe, however, were adversely
affected by the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Eller et al. (2020) show that Asia and Latin
America (LA) received substantially lower capital inflows than other regions before the global
financial crisis and Asian EMs capital flows were significantly affected by the unwinding of Fed
UMP after 2013. Furthermore, Tillmann (2016) documents regional heterogeneity of capital
flows by comparing the Asia‐Pacific and LA regions. In light of the literature on regional
heterogeneity in capital flow dynamics, we investigate how the policies of the three central
banks affected equity capital flows to three different regions: Asia, LA and Europe, Middle
East and Africa (EMEA).
Fourth, one final theme of this paper is the degree to which other global (push) and
country‐specific (pull) factors affect equity capital flows to EMs. In this respect, we include a
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number of push/pull factors identified by the previous literature as important determinants of
portfolio capital flows to EMs and examine their importance.
Our contributions to the literature can be summarised as follows. First, we contribute to the
literature on the link between UMP and capital flows to emerging markets (Chari et al., 2020;
Dahlhaus & Vasishtha, 2020; Gamboa‐Estrada, 2020) and extend it by focusing on the UMP
undertaken by three major central banks (Fed, ECB and BoJ). Furthermore, our data set
consists of equity capital flows to EMs by private global funds (from EPFR Global), enabling us
to isolate and study the responsiveness of foreign investors to monetary policies of the major
central banks.4 Second, we contribute to the literature examining the role of the surprise
component of monetary policy in explaining capital flows to EMs (Chari et al., 2020; Dahlhaus
& Vasishtha, 2020; Koepke, 2018). This is especially relevant because the previous literature has
shown this to be an important factor to foreign investors in EMs. Whereas previous studies
have examined the role of expectations around specific events (e.g., central bank policy
meetings) we are interested in how central bank policy surprises, as reflected in asset growth
surprises (AGS), influence the time‐series flow of equity capital to EMs during the past two
decades. Furthermore, our analysis allows us to derive estimates of both the spillover and
surprise elements of central bank asset growth before and after the implementation of UMP
and, thus, we are able to compare the two effects. Third, our paper builds upon previous work
that capital flows into EMs show strong regional tendencies. In this respect, we investigate how
the policies of the three central banks are transmitted to different EM geographic regions and
account for potential heterogeneous responses across those regions. Finally, our study com-
plements the literature on the determinants of international capital flows by including a set of
global (push) and country‐specific (pull) factors (Fratzscher et al., 2016; Koepke, 2018; Li
et al., 2018). In particular, we find that global (push) factors, one of which is foreign central
bank monetary policy, tend to be significant, whereas domestic (pull) factors are of secondary
importance.
We provide estimation results on the determinants of capital flows and the behaviour of
global investors by combining advantageous fund flows data from EPFR and the growth and
surprise components of monetary policy in the same framework. Our results provide several
insights. First, we find that there are positive, economically large and statistically significant
spillovers from Fed asset growth to EM equity capital flows during the QE period. There is also
limited evidence of spillovers from ECB asset growth but no evidence of QE spillover effects by
the BoJ. These results provide support to the oft‐cited (but little researched in the academic
literature) view on the spillover effects of global liquidity increases, made possible by UMP
(especially by the Fed), on capital flows to EMs. Second, our study finds a negative and
significant relationship between the surprise component of central bank asset growth and
capital flows to EMs. Our evidence shows that global investors respond negatively to un-
certainty and unexpected changes in Fed and (to a lesser extent) ECB monetary policies by
reducing equity investment to EMs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the
relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data and variable measurement and Section 4 pre-
sents the methodological framework. Section 5 highlights the novelty of our empirical results
and Section 6 concludes the paper.
4
The key advantages of the EPFR fund flow data and their conceptual differences from international portfolio flow data derived from Balance of Payments
statistics are discussed in more detail in Koepke (2018). The EPFR capital flows data have been used in a number of recent papers. For a recent study on credit




2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
Our paper relates to two streams of the literature. The first focuses on the determinants of
international capital flows to EMs. The main conclusion of the literature is that the determinants
can be divided into two groups: Global (push) and country‐specific (pull) factors (see Ghosh
et al., 2014, for a general overview). This literature can be subdivided into three main interrelated
strands. First, one group of studies aggregates capital flows to EMs with no distinction between the
various forms of flows (e.g., Calvo et al., 1996; Eller et al., 2020; Fernandez‐Arias, 1996; Ghosh
et al., 2014). The main finding is the dominance of global factors relative to local factors. Second,
several studies distinguish between various forms of capital flows such as foreign direct invest-
ment, portfolio flows or loans (e.g., Broto et al., 2011; Contessi et al., 2013; Kim & Wu, 2008).
Third, more recent studies, including this one, focus increasingly on a specific type of capital
flows, such as portfolio equity flows or portfolio bond flows (e.g., Bathia et al., 2020; Dahlhaus &
Vasishtha, 2020; Fratzscher et al., 2016; Koepke, 2018; Li et al., 2018). This allows investigating the
factors that motivate the decisions of foreign investors.
Most previous studies on the determinants of global capital flows use data from the Balance of
Payments statistics of various emerging economies or flow of funds data from one developed
market (e.g., United States) to various emerging economies (e.g., Ahmed & Zlate, 2014; Edison &
Warnock, 2008). More recent studies use data from Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR)
Global (e.g., Andreou et al., 2020; Dahlhaus & Vasishtha, 2020; Fratzscher et al., 2016; 2018;
Koepke, 2018; Li et al., 2018). The main advantage of EPFR fund flows data is the higher frequency
and disaggregated information (e.g., on the investor type). According to Koepke (2018), EPFR data
can be considered as a ‘timely high‐frequency indicator of portfolio flows movements’.
The second stream of related literature assesses the impact of UMP implemented by the
main central banks on the economies of EMs in general (e.g., Bowman et al., 2015; Eichengreen
& Gupta, 2015; Tillmann, 2016). The main conclusion is that UMP had significant effects on
financial conditions, equity prices, exchange rates and capital flows to EMs. Within this lit-
erature, Anaya et al. (2017), Chari et al. (2020), Fratzscher et al. (2016), ans Kiendrebeogo
(2016), find that UMP implemented by the Fed had a significant impact on portfolio flows from
the United States to EMs. The theoretical justification for this finding is linked to several
transmission channels described in the literature (see Chari et al., 2020; Gamboa‐Estrada, 2020;
Joyce et al., 2012). The first and the one most emphasized in the literature (e.g., Anaya
et al., 2017; Joyce et al., 2012), is a portfolio balance channel, according to which investors
rebalance their portfolios in response to central banks’ purchase of long‐term bonds that lead to
increased global liquidity, and that, in turn, potentially leads to portfolio capital spillovers to
EMs. The second transmission channel is a signalling channel, whereby central bank opera-
tions are interpreted as a signal of lower future policy rates (Bauer & Rudebusch, 2014). The
third or ‘confidence’ channel, relates to changes in investors' risk‐taking behaviour (see
Fratzscher et al., 2016).
One important issue in the literature on UMP relates to the measurement of UMP. One way
to measure the effects of UMP is to use the size of central bank assets in the balance sheet
(Anaya et al., 2017; Gambacorta et al., 2014; Molyneux et al., 2021). In particular, Gambacorta
et al. (2014) argue that central bank assets are a preferable measure of UMP than the monetary
base.5 We also use the growth of central bank assets (CBA) as our measure of UMP. It should be
5
Other studies have used the shadow fed funds rate (Wu & Xia, 2016) and Fed funds futures contracts (Chari et al., 2020; Dahlhaus & Vasishtha, 2020;
Gospodinov & Jamali, 2018; Kiendrebeogo, 2016; Koepke, 2018) as their measure.
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pointed out, however, that our measure of central bank asset growth has been purged of the
effects of changes in the policy interest rate. Section 3 describes the methodology for accounting
for the effects of changes in the policy interest rate on CBA growth.
In this paper, we bring together the various strands of the literature on capital flows and
unconventional monetary policy discussed above. We focus on a single type of flow, equity
capital by global funds, to isolate the response of foreign investors to UMP. We include as
control variables the important push/pull factors identified by the literature. In our empirical
analysis, we include a measure of the extent of UMP undertaken by the three central banks as
well as the surprise element of UMP. Our measure of UMP, the growth of central bank assets, is
readily available for the three central banks on a monthly basis, is comparable across the three
central banks and captures the main element of UMP, the quantitative easing undertaken by
central banks in the wake of the GFC. This measure is especially relevant in examining the
expansion of global liquidity as a result of central bank UMP policies. Our paper provides a
unified framework to test several hypotheses that are discussed in the remainder of the paper,
after a brief description of the data and variables in the next section.
3 | DATA DESCRIPTION AND VARIABLE
MEASUREMENT
The focus of this paper is the relationship between UMP by the major central banks (Fed,
ECB and BoJ) and equity capital inflows to EMs. Given that the relationship between these two
variables is central to our study, first, we describe in detail how we define and measure these
two. To model adequately the main relationship of interest, we include a set of control variables
that condition the relationship and they are also described in this section.
3.1 | Net equity capital inflows to emerging markets/regions
This study makes use of a proprietary data set compiled by EPFR Global as the data source for
net equity capital flows to EMs. As of January 2018, EPFR tracked global funds with over $3tn
in assets globally. Importantly, the funds tracked are registered globally (not just in the United
States) and, thus, EPFR data measure global equity flows to EMs. EPFR combines data on
asset allocation by fund managers and individual fund flows to arrive at a figure for net capital
inflows to individual EMs countries or regions. EPFR provides data at two levels: The in-
dividual country level and the regional level. We work with two samples at the regional (three
regions) and country (16 countries) level. The regional data reported by EPFR are not simply
the sum of individual country data but include capital flows to each region that are not
included in the country sample because some fund managers do not reveal their
asset allocations by country but indicate only allocations by region. The regional sample in-
cludes data for three regions: Asia, LA and EMEA. The country sample includes data for the
following EMs: Brazil, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey.6 The data are
monthly and cover the period from April 1998 to March 2018. The choice of sample and time
6




period is dictated by the availability of sufficiently lengthy time‐series data for each region/
country. More importantly, the 16 EMs in the sample are the largest of the EMs in terms of
economic size, international trade and stock market capitalization.
EPFR calculates net equity inflows (investor contributions minus redemptions) to each EM
or region during each month by excluding portfolio performance and currency fluctuations. To
arrive at a figure for net equity flows, EPFR collects data for each investment fund on: (i) The
fund's rate of return or the (percentage) change in net asset value (RNAV) during the month;
(ii) total net assets (TNA) at the end of each month and, (iii) for funds not denominated in U.S.
dollars, changes during the month in total assets due to currency fluctuations (ΔFX). These
data form the basis for the calculation of net capital inflows to country/region i during month t
in dollars as follows:
FLOW = TNA − (1 + RNAV ) × TNA − ΔFXi t i t i t i t i t, , , , −1 , (1)
Flows by all investment funds are aggregated to arrive at the net capital inflow to each EM/
region during each month. Therefore, FLOW represents net contributions/redemptions of in-
vestors globally to each EM/region after changes in portfolio performance and currency fluc-
tuations have been netted out.
3.2 | Unconventional monetary policy
This paper tests two hypotheses relating to the impact of UMP on equity capital flows to EMs:
one concerns the growth of central bank assets and the second the surprise or innovation
element of the growth of central bank assets. Before testing the hypotheses, it should be noted
that CBA growth, our measure of UMP, contains changes in assets related not only to measures
aimed at quantitative easing but also changes related to the conventional monetary policy tool,
the policy interest rate. It is important, therefore, to disentangle the two effects to compute a
measure of asset growth that is net of the effects of the policy interest rate. To accomplish this
first we obtain a measure of the growth of assets (balance sheet) of the three major central
banks (Fed, ECB and BoJ) as the logarithmic first difference of each central bank's assets
(∆lnCBA).7 Next, we estimate an autoregressive process for the growth of assets of each central
bank separately as follows:8
∑ ∑∆ ∆ϕ ϕ ϕ sint εlnCBA = + lnCBA + + .k t
j
N
j k t j
j
N




2 , − ,
1 2
(2)
In Equation (2), sintk t j, − refers to the main policy interest rate of each central bank (k= 1, 2,
3 refers to each central bank). Therefore, changes in policy rates (what can be thought of as
conventional monetary policy) are allowed to influence the growth of central bank assets. To
arrive at a measure of CBA growth that is shorn of the influences of changes in policy rates (or
∆lnCBA
~
k t, ), after estimating Equation (2) we subtract the linear projection of the policy interest
7
The source of data for central bank assets is the balance sheet accounts of each central bank. The data are available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/
annual/balance/mpo/html/index.en.html (European Central Bank), https://alfred.stlouisfed.org/series?seid=WRESCRT (Federal Reserve) and http://www.
stat-search.boj.or.jp/ssi/cgi-bin/famecgi2?cgi%3D$nme_a000_en%26lstSelection=BS01 (Bank of Japan).
8
The literature on measuring policy surprises or shocks as innovations from an autoregressive process has a long history going back to the literature on the role
of new information or ‘news’ in determining the foreign exchange market forecasting error (see Edwards, 1983 and Hoffman & Schlagenhauf, 1985).
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rate or ∆ ∆ ∑ ϕ sintlnCBA =
~
lnCBA − ˆk t j
N
j k t jk,t , =1 2 , −
2 . This is the measure of CBA growth that will
serve as our indicator of UMP in the empirical analysis. As is well known, in recent years, the
policy interest rates of the three central banks have reached the zero lower bound and
have been effectively negative. Therefore, instead of using the official policy interest rate, in
Equation (2) sintk t j, − refers to the shadow interest rates for the Federal funds rate (Fed), ECB
refinancing rate (ECB) and overnight call rate (BoJ).9
The second hypothesis this paper tests relates to the surprise (or innovation) element in
CBA growth. As noted in the introduction, several studies have argued that investors interpret
surprises to CBA growth as increasing monetary policy uncertainty and are expected to respond
by reducing equity capital flows to EMs. We examine this hypothesis with a measure of asset
growth innovations (or AGS) as the estimated residuals in Equation (2). Finally, we estimate
Equation (2) for each central bank separately via a rolling regression with a 36‐month window.
The choice of optimal lag length (N1 and N2) for each central bank is based on the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC).10
3.3 | Control variables
The set of control variables includes both domestic (pull) and global (push) factors that are
prevalent in the literature. Recent contributions to the literature were discussed in the previous
section. Our intention is to include a set of control variables representative of push and pull
factors to model adequately the determinants of equity capital flows to EMs.
The set of domestic (pull) variables includes sovereign credit ratings, the return on the
domestic equity market, GDP growth and trade openness. We measure the sovereign credit rating
of each country as the letter credit rating assigned to it by Standard and Poor's (S&P) at the end of
each month. S&P is considered the ‘lead’ agency among the three major rating agencies (see
Gande & Parsley, 2014). The credit rating measure (CR) is the letter grade assigned by S&P to the
sovereign credit rating of a country's long‐term foreign‐currency obligations. The letter grade is
transformed to a numerical scale and CR is calculated such that each letter rating provided by the
S&P (the letter ratings range from SD/D to AAA) is assigned to a numerical value from 0 to 21
with higher numbers implying improved ratings (e.g., Almeida et al., 2017; Andreou et al., 2020).
The rate of return of the domestic stock market (MRET) is calculated as the percentage change in
the monthly MSCI equity index for each EM. The growth rate of GDP (i) for each country is
obtained from quarterly data on domestic GDP for each country in US dollars. Quarterly GDP
figures are transformed to a monthly frequency using the Chow and Lin (1971) interpolation
technique and the monthly growth rate is the logarithmic first difference of monthly dollar GDP
converted to annual terms. Finally, the literature identifies trade openness (OPENNESS) as an
important element of a country's profile in attracting foreign capital; we measure trade openness
as the sum of imports and exports scaled by GDP.
The set of global (push) factors includes general financial market uncertainty and
economic policy uncertainty. First, global market uncertainty is measured by the (change)
9
The calculation of the shadow policy rate for the Fed and the ECB follows the method in Wu and Xia (2016) and the data are available at https://sites.google.
com/view/jingcynthiawu/shadow-rates. The shadow rate for BoJ follows Krippner (2013) and the data are available at https://www.ljkmfa.com/test-test/
international-ssrs.
10
The AIC optimal lag length (N1, N2) is (2,1) for the Fed, (3,3) for the ECB and (3,1) for the BoJ. In the robustness section, we report on alternative estimations




in the VIX index (ΔVIX), the indicator of US stock market volatility. The VIX measure has
become known as the ‘fear’ index and is widely used as an indicator of uncertainty
regarding global financial market conditions (e.g., Anaya et al., 2017; Ghosh et al., 2014;
Lalancette & Simonato, 2017). Second, because one of this paper's principal objectives is
to study the effects of surprises (uncertainty) in central bank monetary policy, we need to
distinguish between the effects of monetary policy uncertainty from that of general eco-
nomic policy uncertainty. To this end, we include as a control variable the Baker et al.
(2016) index of economic policy uncertainty (EPU). This index has been shown to be
important in capturing the effects of economic policy uncertainty on cross‐border capital
flows (Julio & Yook, 2016).11
The data source for the control variables is DataStream except for credit ratings that are
from various reports of S&P and the economic policy uncertainty indexes from www.
policyuncertainty.com. Table 1 reports summary statistics. The table shows that on average,
each of the 16 EMs experienced a monthly net equity capital inflow of $9.4 million during
1998–2018.12 At the regional level, average net equity inflows were negligible. The overall
regional average, however, masks substantial regional variation: Net monthly capital inflows to
Asia ($120 million) counterbalanced by substantial net outflows for EMEA and LA. Further-
more, capital flows tend to be relatively volatile, as measured by the high standard deviations at
both the country and regional level: The coefficient of variation is 45.6 at the country level, 25.6
for Asia, 10.3 for EMEA and 20.7 for LA.
Figure 1 shows monthly net capital inflows and Figure 2 cumulative capital inflows to the
three regions. The figures show that equity inflows are relatively low and stable until 2003, a
period when EMs were, for all intents and purposes, closed to foreign equity portfolio flows.
The value of cross‐border equity flows to all three regions increases substantially after 2003,
especially those to Asia. The period preceding the GFC exhibits substantial volatility and the
volatile pattern persists in the years following the crisis (especially evident in flows to Asia).
This would suggest that, as Raddatz and Schmukler (2012) point out, cross‐border fund flows
play an important role in the transmission of shocks across global markets in the postcrisis
period. It is worth noting that cumulative capital flows continue to increase after the onset of
the GFC and until 2011. As has been previously noted, during the early years of the GFC,
capital flows were redirected from developed markets to EMs as these countries continued to
experience reasonable growth rates (compared to developed markets) and did not begin to
experience the economic impact of the GFC until the early 2010s. After 2011, cumulative
capital flows to all three regions decline.
Table 1 shows that the average rate of growth of central bank assets is positive for all
three, with the ECB experiencing the highest monthly growth (1.25%) followed by the Fed
and BoJ. Higher asset growth is particularly evident after the central banks took extra-
ordinary measures to boost liquidity through QE measures. This can be seen in Figure 3
that plots each central bank's assets (converted to US dollars using average exchange
rates) and Figure 4 that shows assets scaled by domestic GDP. The Fed's assets increase
rapidly in the months following October 2008 as the Fed was the first central bank to
11
Baker et al. (2016) report EPU indexes at the aggregate (global) and disaggregate levels. Given that we look at three central banks, the empirical specification
includes the economic policy uncertainty index relevant to each central bank, that is, the US EPU for the Fed, Europe EPU for the ECB and Japan EPU for
the BoJ.
12
Descriptive statistics for net equity capital flows to each individual country are reported in Appendix A1. The leader in attracting equity flows is India,
followed by South Korea, Brazil and Russia. Seven countries experienced net capital outflows with China leading the way, followed by Mexico.
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engage in large‐scale bond purchases. Starting in June 2013, the Fed announced its in-
tention to scale back its bond purchase scheme (the ‘taper tantrum’). In October 2010,
BoJ announced the start of a QE programme on a relatively limited scale. The BoJ bond‐
buying programme was subsequently expanded to ¥60–70tn in April 2013 and ¥80tn the
TABLE 1 Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics for 16 emerging markets (EMs) and three EM regions from April 1998 to
March 2018. The variables are defined in Section 3: FLOW represents net contributions/redemptions of
investors globally to each EM/region after changes in portfolio performance and currency fluctuations have
been netted out; ΔlnCBA denotes central bank asset growth defined as the logarithmic first difference of each
central bank's (Federal Reserve [FED], European Central Bank [ECB] and Bank of Japan [BOJ]) assets; AGS
refers to asset growth surprise; EPU is the Index of Economic Policy Uncertainty, ΔVIX is the change in the VIX
Index; MRET is the rate of return of the domestic stock market calculated as the percentage change in the
monthly MSCI equity index for each EM; GDPGR is the growth rate of GDP for each country, OPENNESS
denotes trade openness measured as the sum of imports and exports scaled by GDP; CR denotes credit ratings
given by the Standard and Poor's (S&P) and ΔTEDSPREAD is the change in the TED spread. Abbreviations:
EMEA, Europe, Middle East and Africa; LA, Latin America.
Variable Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
FLOW: 16 EMs 9.471 −0.310 432.188 −8,316.960 5,061.270
FLOW: 3 Regions 0.779 −25.195 1,893.844 −14,403.080 8,842.010
FLOW: Asia 119.873 107.140 3,066.286 −14,403.080 8,842.010
FLOW: EMEA −75.496 −27.660 781.530 −3,875.950 2,729.830
FLOW: LA −42.040 −53.050 868.981 −2,939.880 3,341.580
ΔlnCBA:: Fed 0.929 0.399 4.191 −9.816 55.542
AGS: Fed 0.000 0.076 0.998 −6.736 4.011
ΔlnCBA: ECB 1.250 0.837 7.912 −36.014 45.389
AGS: ECB 0.000 −0.142 0.998 −3.041 4.656
ΔlnCBA: BoJ 0.884 0.728 5.738 −24.138 29.747
AGS: BoJ 0.000 0.038 0.998 −4.134 4.423
US EPU 111.037 102.146 35.614 57.203 245.127
Europe EPU 141.928 133.031 65.042 47.692 433.278
Japan EPU 107.901 102.089 35.121 48.569 236.243
ΔVIX −0.005 −0.130 4.519 −15.280 20.500
MRET 0.959 1.028 8.912 −64.765 71.726
GDPGR 4.226 4.369 4.169 −19.847 22.302
OPENNESS 61.637 43.581 51.987 1.807 345.872
CR 12.841 13.000 3.487 0.000 20.000




following year and continued until 2018.13 The ECB was the last of the three major central
banks to implement a QE programme in March 2015 when it begun to buy €60 billion of

















































EMEA Latin America Asia
FIGURE 1 Monthly net equity inflows to three emerging market regions (billion US dollars).


















































EMEA Latin America Asia
FIGURE 2 Cumulative net equity inflows to three emerging market regions (billion US dollars).
EMEA, Europe, Middle East and Africa
13
In fact, the BoJ was the first of the three banks to engage in a QE programme in 2001 when the first signs of deflation appeared. The programme was
ineffective and was reversed after 5 years. We do not consider this QE programme as it was carried out before the GFC and we have very few observations
before the start of this programme.
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bank (and the tapering by the Fed) will be utilized in the empirical section to account for
the effects of UMP on capital flows to EMs. Finally, with regard to Table 1, it is note-
worthy that the Fed and BoJ experienced relatively large AGS (the Fed experienced the




































































































































Fed ECB Bank of Japan
FIGURE 4 Central Bank Assets (percentage of gross domestic product). ECB, European Central Bank;
Fed, Federal Reserve
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We examine the main hypotheses via a panel model with fixed effects to exploit the time and
cross‐country variation within our data. The model estimated initially is:
∆ ζ Zα θ θ u×FLOW = + × lnCBA
~
+ × AGS + + .i ti t i k t k t i t, −1, 1 , 2 , , (3)
The model includes country/region specific effects α( )i and a vector Z of control variables that
were discussed in the previous sections.15 The model includes, among the control variables,
lagged values of the dependent variable (LAGFLOW) to allow (and test) for persistence in
capital inflows. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable is important because high‐
frequency (monthly) time‐series flow data exhibit strong autocorrelation, a specification that is
consistent with the models in Lim and Mohapatra (2016) and Chari et al. (2020). The esti-
mation method is instrumental variables (IV) because, in the presence of a lagged dependent
variable, least‐squares fixed‐effects estimation would result in an inconsistent estimate for
LAGFLOW.16 The model in Equation (3) is the initial empirical specification that tests two
hypotheses: (i) There are spillovers from central bank asset growth to capital flows (the esti-
mate of θ1) and (ii) AGS influence investor behaviour and, as a result, net capital flows to EMs
(the estimate of θ2).
The model in Equation (3), however, assumes a uniform effect of asset growth and surprises
on capital flows across time. Because our main interest is the investigation of the effects of UMP
(central bank quantitative easing) on capital flows, we need to allow for different effects before
and after the adoption of QE. Thus, we estimate an alternative model that allows the response
coefficient to differ before and after by introducing an indicator variable that distinguishes
between the pre‐ and post‐UMP period and by including several interaction effects. Specifically,
we estimate the model
∆ ∆
ζ Z
α θ θ θ
θ θ θ
β u×
FLOW = + × lnCBA
~
+ ( − ) × lnCBA
~
× DUMP
+ × AGS + ( − ) × AGS
× DUMP + × DUMP + + ,i t
i t i k t k t k t
k t k t
k t k t i t, −1
, 1PRE , 1POST 1PRE , ,
2PRE , 2POST 2PRE ,
, , ,
(4)
where DUMPk is an indicator variable that equals 1 after the adoption of QE policies by central
bank k and 0 before. The model in Equation (4) estimates the effects of asset growth and
surprises before the adoption of QE (the estimates of θ1PRE and θ2PRE) and after the adoption of
QE (the estimates of θ1POST and θ2POST). Estimation of these parameters allows a discussion and
comparison of the effects of central bank actions on net capital inflows before and after the
implementation of QE.
In Section 5, we report the estimates of the parameters of interest (θ1PRE, θ2PRE, θ1POST and
θ2POST) and Wald‐tests for their significance. The dates of the start of QE operations by each
central bank were discussed in the previous section. Moreover, given that the Fed began
operations to reduce the size of its balance sheet assets in 2013 (the ‘tapering’ and its much‐
discussed impact on EMs capital flows), the relevant model in Equation (4) for the Fed includes
15
The control variables (except those expressed as changes) are lagged one period for two reasons: First, to allow sufficient time for the responsiveness of
capital flows to take effect and, second, to mitigate possible endogeneity of the control variables.
16
This issue is discussed in Maddala and Lahiri (2009, Ch. 13). Instruments for LAGFLOW are lagged values of the control variables so that instruments are
dated t−2. In addition to the control variables, we include as instrument (lagged) values of global commodity prices (at t−2). It should be noted that dynamic
panel methodologies of the Arellano/Bond type are not appropriate in our case with a relatively short cross‐section dimension and relatively long time‐series
dimension.
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interaction effects with two indicator variables: DUMP that signifies the start of QE (as for the
other two central banks) and a second indicator variable DTAPER that equals 1 after the start
of tapering operations by the Fed and 0 before.17
The models in Equations (3) and (4) are estimated separately for each of the three central
banks (Fed, ECB and BoJ) and for two samples: One that contains data on capital flows to 16
emerging economies and the other to three regions. The elements of the vector of control
variables in Z for the 16‐country sample were discussed in the previous section. The control
variables for the region‐specific sample are generally global because region‐specific variables
such as GDP growth, credit rating, openness are not available on a regional basis. They include
an additional control variable related to global financial markets, the change in the spread
between the 3‐month Treasury bill rate and the 3‐month LIBOR rate, what is known as the
TED spread (ΔTEDSPREAD). This is considered to be a measure of the tightness of global
credit conditions (see Chari et al., 2020) so that an increase in ΔTEDSPREAD is tantamount to
a tightening of global credit conditions and is expected to have a negative effect on equity
capital flows. As discussed in the following section, because the regional sample contains only
three regions, it allows us to exploit the geographic dimension and test for geographic differ-
ences in the responsiveness of capital flows. Thus, regional data provide insights into possible
differential effects across regions. To model this, we include in the estimation three indicator
variables equal to 1 for each of the three regions and 0 otherwise. For regional data, we also
estimate a version of Equation (4) that includes double interaction effects between DUMP (and
DTAPER) and each of the three regional indicator variables. The following section presents the
empirical results.
5 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 | Results for 16 EM economies
We estimate, first, the model in Equation (3) with data on capital inflows to the 16 EMs listed
previously. The results are in Table 2. We find support for the hypothesis that Fed asset growth
has positive spillovers to EM equity capital flows. The effect is statistically significant and
economically important: A one percentage point increase in asset growth increases capital
flows by, on average, $2.1 million per month to each EM. Second, we also find support for the
hypothesis that Fed AGS have a negative and significant effect on EM capital flows. This result
is consistent with the finding of Koepke (2018) and Chari et al. (2020) that the surprise element
of monetary policy plays an important role in capital flows dynamics. The economic size of the
effect shows that a one‐standard‐deviation increase in Fed asset growth surprise reduces capital
flows to EMs by about $11 million. In addition, ECB AGS are negatively and significantly
related to EM capital flows. In terms of magnitude the effect is similar to that of the Fed: A one‐
standard‐deviation increase in ECB asset growth surprise reduces capital flows to EMs by $9
million. The effects for BoJ asset growth or surprises are insignificant.
17
To conserve space, the equivalent model in Equation (4) for the Fed is not reported. We note, however, that it includes two sets of interaction effects:
between∆
∼
lnCBA , on the one hand and DUMP and DTAPER, on the other, as well as interaction effects between AGS and DUMP and DTAPER. In Section 5,
we report two sets of coefficient estimates: (a) for the effects of asset growth and surprises after the start of QE and before the start of tapering and (b) for the




Concerning the control variables, the persistence coefficient is positive and significant for
all central banks and highest for the Fed, consistent with the findings of Lim and Mohapatra
(2016) and Koepke (2018). An increase in global financial market volatility, or the month‐to‐
month change in the VIX index, by one point, reduces capital flows by, on average, $8 million
to each EM. Moreover, a one percentage point increase in domestic GDP growth is associated
with a $2–$4 million increase in capital flows. General economic policy uncertainty does not
influence significantly capital inflows. The effects of central bank asset growth on EM equity
capital flows are independent of general economic policy uncertainty during the period under
consideration.
Next, we examine differences between the pre‐ and post‐UMP periods by estimating the
model in Equation (4). The results are in Table 3. For the UMO policy of the Fed, they confirm
the main hypotheses of this paper. First, there are no spillover effects from Fed asset growth to
equity flows before the start of UMP. There is, however, positive and significant spillover after
the adoption of QE policies by the Fed: A 1% increase in Fed asset growth is, on average,
associated with a $3.2 million monthly increase in equity flows to individual EMs. There is no
evidence of spillovers after the start of tapering operations by the Fed. Second, AGS after the
start of Fed QE operations are negatively and significantly related to net capital inflows: A one
standard deviation increase in AGS reduces capital flows to individual EMs by, on average,
$16.1 million per month; the effect of before the start of QE by the Fed is insignificant. Third,
when it comes to the other two central banks, ECB and BoJ, there is no evidence of spillover
effects. Fourth, regarding the control variables, the persistence coefficient is significant and
TABLE 2 Equity capital inflows and central bank assets: Sixteen emerging markets
This table reports instrumental‐variables fixed‐effects estimates of the model in Equation (3) for the 16‐country
sample. The dependent variable is FLOW (net capital inflows to each country).∆
∼
lnCBA is a measure of central
bank asset growth that is net of the effects of changes in the policy rate (as described in Section 3.2). LAGFLOW
is the lagged value of the dependent variable. The description of the other variables is in Table 1.
Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent t statistics in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level,




lnCBA 2.064 (2.06)** −0.081 (−0.62) −2.871 (−1.15)
AGS −10.955 (−2.02)** −8.715 (−3.03)*** 8.509 (0.67)
LAGFLOW 0.644 (3.28)*** 0.421 (2.45)** 0.421 (1.80)*
ΔVIX −8.583 (−2.00)** −8.286 (−1.93)* −8.420 (−2.03)**
MRET −0.791 (−0.75) 0.012 (0.01) −0.062 (−0.05)
EPU 0.019 (0.07) −0.095 (−0.64) −0.230 (−0.64)
GDPGR 3.748 (1.96)** 2.707 (1.95)* 2.327 (2.21)**
OPENNESS 0.302 (1.34) 0.513 (1.32) 0.346 (1.19)
CR −1.212 (−0.34) −2.140 (−0.52) −1.925 (−0.42)
Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,616 3,488 3,616
R2 0.135 0.135 0.136
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highest for the Fed. Of the push (global) factors, an increase in the monthly change in VIX by
one point reduces capital flows by, on average, $9 million to each EM, whereas changes in
economic policy uncertainty are insignificant. Of the pull factors, an increase in the growth rate
of GDP by one percentage point increases flows by $2–$4 million. The coefficient estimates for
the two indicator variables (DUMP and DTAPER) are insignificant so that, after accounting for
monetary policy and other push/pull factors, there is no evidence of changes in mean capital
flows after the start of UMP. To sum up, we find evidence that UMP operations by the Fed had
important spillovers for equity capital inflows to individual EMs: Increases in Fed asset growth
TABLE 3 Equity capital inflows and unconventional monetary policy: Sixteen emerging markets
This table reports instrumental‐variables fixed‐effects estimates of model in Equation (4) for the 16‐country
sample. The dependent variable is FLOW (net capital inflows to each country).∆
∼
lnCBA is a measure of central
bank asset growth that is net of the effects of changes in the policy rate. LAGFLOW is the lagged value of the
dependent variable. The description of the other variables is in Table 1. PRE‐UMP refers to the time period
before adoption of unconventional monetary policy, POST‐UMP refers to the time period after the
unconventional monetary policy and POST‐TAPER the time period after the Fed tapering operations. DUMP is
an indicator variable that equals 1 after the adoption of unconventional monetary policy by a central bank (and
0 before) and DTAPER is an indicator variable that equals 1 after the start of tapering operations by the Fed
(and 0 before). Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent t statistics in parentheses. ***Significant at the
0.01 level, **significant at the 0.05 level and *significant at the 0.10 level.
FED ECB BoJ




lnCBA: PRE‐UMP 1.187 (0.87) −0.244 (−1.42) −0.223 (−0.55)
AGS: PRE‐UMP 4.883 (0.31) −4.069 (−1.29) −1.747 (−0.35)
∆
∼
lnCBA: POST‐UMP 3.232 (1.97)** 7.414 (1.04) −6.105 (−0.95)
AGS: POST‐UMP −16.140 (−2.60)** −68.924 (−1.59) 9.576 (0.24)
∆
∼
lnCBA: POST‐TAPER −33.877 (−1.49)
AGS: POST‐TAPER 106.542 (1.16)
LAGFLOW 0.728 (3.21)*** 0.518 (3.15)*** 0.428 (1.71)*
ΔVIX −8.895 (−2.03) −8.834 (−2.05)** −8.428 (−2.05)**
MRET −1.120 (−1.31)** −0.534 (−0.56) −0.088 (−0.07)
EPU 0.192 (0.43) −0.182 (−1.53) −0.223 (−0.55)
GDPGR 4.201 (2.03)** 2.512 (2.03)** 1.910 (1.94)*
OPENNESS 0.329 (1.26) 0.464 (1.24) 0.371 (1.03)
CR −0.302 (−0.18) −1.981 (−0.55) 0.242 (0.08)
Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,616 3,488 3,616




were funneled into higher capital inflows during the post‐UMP period and largerAGSs had a
dampening effect on capital inflows post‐UMP.
5.2 | Results for three EM regions
Estimates of the model in Equation (3) for the three‐region sample are in Table 4. The results
are supportive of the conclusions from the 16‐country sample. Fed and ECB asset growth has
positive and significant spillovers to regional capital flows. The economic effect of the Fed is
larger than that of the ECB: A one percentage point increase in Fed asset growth is associated
with a $16.8 million monthly increase in regional EM capital flows and for ECB asset growth
with a $3.2 increase. Moreover, Fed AGS have a negative effect on capital inflows: A one
standard deviation is associated with a reduction in monthly flows of $116.4 million. There is
no evidence of significant policy effects from BoJ asset growth/surprises on EM capital flows.
The estimate of the persistence coefficient for the Fed is significant and roughly in line with
that of the individual EM results in Table 2. The two factors that measure global financial
market risk/liquidity are important. An increase in the month‐to‐month change in VIX by one
point is associated with a reduction of $95 million, but the effect is (marginally) insignificant.
Moreover, an increase in the month‐to‐month change in the TED spread by 0.1 percentage
point is associated with a reduction in capital flows of $28–$49 million and the effect is
significant (0.05 level). Economic policy uncertainty, on the contrary, plays no role in de-
termining EM equity capital flows. In sum, global financial conditions are important drivers of
regional equity capital flows.
TABLE 4 Equity capital inflows and central bank assets: Emerging market regions
This table reports instrumental‐variables fixed‐effects estimates of the model in Equation (3) for the three‐
region sample. The dependent variable is FLOW (net capital inflows to each region). ∆
∼
lnCBA is a measure of
central bank asset growth that is net of the effects of changes in the policy rate. LAGFLOW is the lagged value
of the dependent variable. The description of the other variables is in Table 1. Heteroskedastic and
autocorrelation consistent t statistics in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **significant at the 0.05




lnCBA 16.759 (3.32)*** 3.188 (2.20)** −30.848 (−0.72)
AGS −116.437 (−1.71)* −49.773 (−1.35) 151.602 (0.74)
LAGFLOW 0.611 (3.64)*** 0.538 (3.68)*** 0.538 (2.82)***
ΔVIX −95.356 (−1.68)* −96.21 (−1.62) −93.950 (−1.62)
ΔTEDSPREAD −276.327 (−6.42)*** −485.204 (−3.62)*** −494.643 (−2.10)**
EPU −0.795 (−0.85) −1.376 (−1.01) −1.495 (0.35)
Region effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 699 660 693
R2 0.240 0.244 0.243
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Results from the estimation of Equation (4) that allows for the differential effects of monetary
policies before and after the implementation of QE are in Table 5.18 There are significant spillover
effects from Fed asset growth to EM regional capital flows but the effect more than doubles after the
start of UMP by the Fed ($13 million pre‐UMP relative to $32 million post‐UMP for every 1% growth
in Fed assets). Fed AGS are negatively related to EM capital flows, but the effect is (marginally)
insignificant in the post‐UMP period. The evidence for positive spillovers from the other two central
banks is very limited: There is a positive effect only for pre‐UMP asset growth for the ECB and none
for the BoJ. Finally, the estimates of the control variables are consistent with the previous discussion.
We exploit the limited (three) cross‐sectional dimension of the regional data to test the effects of
UMP policies across geographic regions. We re‐estimate Equation (4) including a second interaction
effect between central bank asset growth (surprises) with time (pre‐ and post‐UMP) and geographic
region (Asia, LA and EMEA). The results are in Table 6.19 They are consistent with our previous
conclusions. First, there are significant spillovers from Fed asset growth to Asia and LA. Whereas the
TABLE 5 Equity capital inflows and unconventional monetary policy: Three emerging market regions
This table reports instrumental‐variables fixed‐effects estimates of the model in Equation (4) for the three‐
region sample. The dependent variable is FLOW (net capital inflows to each region). ∆
∼
lnCBA is a measure of
central bank asset growth that is net of the effects of changes in the policy rate. LAGFLOW is the lagged value
of the dependent variable. The description of the other variables is in Table 1. PRE‐UMP refers to the time
period before adoption of unconventional monetary policy, POST‐UMP refers to the time period after the
unconventional monetary policy and POST‐TAPER the time period after the Fed tapering operations.
Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent t statistics in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level,




lnCBA: PRE‐UMP 13.324 (3.31)*** 1.216 (2.18)** 17.227 (1.39)
AGS: PRE‐UMP −104.106 (−1.93)** −12.099 (−0.61) −59.650 (−0.76)
∆
∼
lnCBA: POST‐UMP 31.938 (1.77)* 98.864 (0.83) −119.438 (−1.11)
AGS: POST‐UMP −142.981 (−1.57) −627.155 (−1.39) 543.932 (1.13)
∆
∼
lnCBA: POST‐TAPER −421.255 (−1.18)
AGS: POST‐TAPER 1,659.919 (1.28)
LAGFLOW 0.597 (3.40)*** 0.554 (3.70)*** 0.506 (2.54)**
ΔVIX −93.278 (−1.69)* −98.642 (−1.60) −92.312 (−1.64)
ΔTEDSPREAD −215.836 (−3.03)*** −466.195 (−4.17)*** −493.146 (−2.09)**
EPU −1.486 (−0.97) −1.874 (−1.09) −1.899 (−0.41)
Region effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 699 660 693
R2 0.253 0.254 0.259
18
For the regional model, because of perfect multicollinearity between the geographic region indicator variables and the UMP indicator variables, it is not
possible to estimate separate coefficients for the indicator variables DUMP and DTAPER.
19
It is not possible to use the fixed effect methodology for the estimation of this model because of interaction effects with the three regional indicator variables.




TABLE 6 Equity capital inflows and unconventional monetary policy: Three EM regions and geographic
effects
This table reports generalized two‐stage instrumental variable estimates of model in Equation (4) for the three‐
region sample. The dependent variable is FLOW (net capital inflows to each region). ∆lnCBA
~
is a measure of
central bank asset growth that is net of the effects of changes in the policy rate. LAGFLOW is the lagged value
of the dependent variable. The description of the other variables is in Table 1. The model includes interaction
effects between central bank asset growth (surprises) with time (pre‐ and post‐UMP) and geographic region
(Asia, Latin America and EMEA). Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent t statistics in




lnCBA: PRE‐UMP ASIA −16.435 (−1.95)** 3.042 (2.45)*** 38.976 (2.17)**
∆
∼
lnCBA: PRE‐UMP EMEA 18.404 (1.46) 0.492 (0.37) 17.154 (1.10)
∆
∼
lnCBA: PRE‐UMP LA 31.656 (3.30)*** 0.113 (0.07) −4.449 (−0.18)
AGS: PRE‐UMP ASIA −55.907 (−4.80)*** −85.224 (−3.29)*** −132.714 (−1.74)*
AGS: PRE‐UMP EMEA 9.250 (0.79) 57.704 (2.06)** −105.013 (−1.58)
AGS: PRE‐UMP LA −40.012 (−4.14)*** −8.775 (−0.19) 58.776 (0.53)
∆
∼
lnCBA: POST‐UMP ASIA 89.929 (3.58)*** 248.350 (2.22)** −221.487 (−2.71)***
∆
∼
lnCBA: POST‐UMP EMEA −7.167 (−0.50) 10.229 (1.23) −59.771 (−1.53)
∆
∼
lnCBA: POST‐UMP LA 3.032 (0.25) 38.014 (2.96)*** −77.055 (−1.62)
AGS: POST‐UMP ASIA −327.796 (−8.95)*** −1,085.077 (−3.29)*** 1,048.069 (4.89)***
AGS: POST‐UMP EMEA −2.861 (−0.10) −248.668 (−2.27)*** 236.701 (1.12)
AGS: POST‐UMP LA −113.105 (−11.91)*** −547.718 (−2.82)*** 347.027 (1.34)
∆
∼
lnCBA: POST‐TAPER ASIA −856.313 (−3.64)***
∆
∼
lnCBA: POST‐TAPER EMEA −154.893 (−3.20)***
∆
∼
lnCBA: POST‐TAPER LA −221.426 (−1.82)*
AGS: POST‐TAPER ASIA 4,461.972 (16.34)***
AGS: POST‐TAPER EMEA 243.204 (0.77)
AGS: POST‐TAPER LA 245.923 (3.88)***
LAGFLOW 0.608 (3.31)*** 0.559 (3.98)*** 0.506 (2.52)**
ΔVIX −95.149 (−1.69)* −101.275 (−1.56) −92.312 (−1.63)
ΔTEDSPREAD −272.197 (−4.24)*** −454.081 (−4.31)*** −493.146 (−2.08)**
EPU −1.365 (−0.89) −1.967 (−1.01) −1.899 (−0.41)
Region effects No No No
Observations 696 660 693
R2 0.267 0.269 0.266
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spillovers to Asia are negative pre‐UMP, they are positive, significant and economically large (about
$90 million) post‐UMP. Second, Fed AGS are negatively related to capital flows to Asia and LA pre
and post‐UMP, but the effect is economically much larger during the post‐UMP period. Third, after
the start of tapering operations by the Fed, asset growth is negatively (and significantly) related to
equity capital flows to all three regions (highest for Asia). This result can be interpreted as Fed
monetary policy exerting negative spillovers on EMs capital flows after the start of tapering and is
consistent with the oft‐cited claim that Fed operations during the post‐tapering period saw equity
capital flow out of many EMs (e.g., Aizenman et al., 2016; Nechio, 2014).20 In addition, our finding
that the negative effect was the highest for the Asian region is in line with Eller et al. (2020) who
show that Asia was strongly impacted by the unwinding of US monetary policy. Fourth, there are
significant positive spillovers from ECB asset growth to Asia and LA post‐UMP; the effect pre‐UMP is
insignificant for LA and EMEA and significant but very small in magnitude ($3 million) for Asia.
ECB AGS are negatively and significantly related to equity flows post‐UMP to all three regions.
Finally, there is very limited evidence for spillovers from asset growth/surprises for the BoJ to Asia.
This finding, however, must be seen critically in light of the consistently insignificant effects of BoJ
policy on EM capital flows elsewhere in this paper. Estimates of the control variables are robust and
consistent with previous results. In conclusion, there is evidence of positive spillover effects from Fed
and ECB asset growth post‐UMP primarily towards Asia and to a lesser extent LA and no evidence of
spillovers to EMEA. AGS are negatively related to equity capital flows to Asia and LA and the effect is
larger in magnitude for Asia.
5.3 | Are AGS asymmetric?
One of the important conclusions of this paper is that AGS are negatively related to equity
capital flows, a finding consistent with the argument that foreign investors treat larger
surprises as an indication of increased uncertainty surrounding the conduct of monetary
policy and respond by reducing equity flows to EMs. A related question is whether in-
vestors treat positive and negative asset surprises in a similar manner or, alternatively,
whether AGS are symmetric. In other words, do investors treat higher asset growth than
that predicted by the autoregressive process similarly to lower asset growth than the
predicted growth? To investigate this hypothesis, we estimate a modified version of the
model in Equation (3) as follows:
∆
ζ Z




FLOW = + × lnCBA
~




i t i k t k t k t t
i t, −1
, 1 , NEG , POS NEG , ,
, (5)
In this model, DPOS is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the asset growth surprise is
positive and is zero otherwise. The hypothesis of the symmetry/asymmetry of surprises is tantamount
to a test of the significance of the estimate of the interaction term, that is, the estimate of
θ θ( − ).POS NEG Estimation results of Equation (5) for both the 16‐country and three‐region samples
are in Table 7. There is no evidence of asymmetry: the hypothesis θ θ=POS NEG cannot be rejected in
any of the cases. Thus, the estimation of a single coefficient for positive and negative surprises in the
20
The post‐taper positive effect of AGS for Asia and LA may itself be surprising. It may be interpreted as investors’ revising their expectations regarding Fed
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previous tables appears justified. The remaining coefficient estimates are very similar to our previous
results.
5.4 | Restricted sample with data after the start of UMP
Our sample covers the period April 1998–March 2018 to allow maximum time coverage consistent
with data availability. As noted in Section 3.3, UMP operations by the three central banks begun at
different points after October 2008 (the start of QE operations by the Fed). The empirical framework
in Equation (4) allows us to use maximum data availability and obtain and compare estimates before
and after the start of UMP operations. An interesting question, however, is to examine whether our
hypotheses hold during the period when UMP was in operation by each of the three central banks.
Thus, we estimate a specification akin to Equation (3) only for the period after the start of UMP
TABLE 8 Equity capital inflows and unconventional monetary policy: Restricted sample 16 emerging
markets
This table reports instrumental‐variables fixed‐effects estimates for the 16‐country sample for a restricted
sample after the start of UMP (after 2008) by each of the three central banks. For the exact date of the start of
UMP by each of the three central banks see the text. The dependent variable is FLOW (net capital inflows to
each country). ∆
∼
lnCBA is a measure of central bank asset growth that is net of the effects of changes in the
policy rate. LAGFLOW is the lagged value of the dependent variable. The description of the other variables is in
Table 1. POST TAPER refers to the time period after the Fed tapering operations. DTAPER is an indicator
variable that equals 1 after the start of tapering operations by the Fed and 0 otherwise. Heteroskedastic and
autocorrelation consistent t statistics in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **significant at the 0.05





lnCBA: POST‐UMP 3.356 (2.14)** 12.296 (2.45)** −6.948 (−1.04)
AGS: POST‐UMP −20.736 (−2.80)*** −84.441 (−1.77)* 19.188 (0.47)
∆
∼
lnCBA: POST‐TAPER −45.432 (−1.92)**
AGS: POST‐TAPER 102.434 (1.34)
LAGFLOW 0.522 (2.51)** 0.263 (1.88)* 0.443 (2.38)**
ΔVIX −12.073 (−1.72)* −15.996 (−1.20) −11.786 (−1.56)
MRET 1.294 (1.49) −1.314 (−0.44) 0.645 (0.32)
EPU 0.072 (0.08) −0.373 (−1.41) −1.061 (−1.31)
GDPGR 9.872 (2.10)** 2.942 (0.36) 9.087 (1.51)
OPENNESS 0.278 (0.45) 4.311 (1.21) −0.794 (−0.35)
CR −7.685 (−1.14) −37.344 (−0.36) −14.184 (−1.18)
Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Observation 1,776 560 1,408




operations by the three central banks, specifically after October 2008 (Fed), after March 2015 (ECB)
and after October 2010 (BoJ).21 Thus, we provide estimates and hypotheses tests for only the period of
UMP operations but at the cost of a substantially reduced time dimension for our sample.
The results from the restricted sample are in Tables 8 and 9 for the 16 EMs and three EM regions,
respectively. The results are completely consistent with our previous findings and provide additional
support for our main hypotheses. Fed UMP policies after 2008 had statistically and economically
significant spillovers on EM equity capital flows: A one percentage point increase in Fed asset growth
increases capital flows by, on average, $3.4 million per month to each EM (Table 8). Second, Fed
AGS are negatively and significantly related to EM equity capital flows: A one standard deviation
increase in AGS reduces capital flows by, on average, $20.7 million per month to each EM. Both
effects are similar to those for the complete sample in Table 3. Third, there is evidence of a reversal of
Fed asset growth spillover effects after the start of tapering operations: Fed asset growth is negatively
and significantly related to EM equity capital flows after tapering. This reinforces the argument (see
Section 5.2) that the start of Fed tapering operations was a significant event and marked a reversal
when it comes to capital flow spillovers to EMs. Fourth, there is evidence of significant positive
TABLE 9 Equity capital inflows and unconventional monetary policy: Restricted sample of three emerging
market regions
This table reports instrumental variables fixed‐effects estimates for the three‐region sample for a restricted
sample after the start of UMP (after 2008) by each of the three central banks. For the exact date of the start of
UMP by each of the three central banks see the text. The dependent variable is FLOW (net capital inflows to
each region).∆
∼
lnCBA is a measure of central bank asset growth that is net of the effects of changes in the policy
rate. LAGFLOW is the lagged value of the dependent variable. The description of the other variables is in
Table 1. POST‐TAPER refers to the time period after the Fed tapering operations. Heteroskedastic and
autocorrelation consistent t statistics in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **significant at the 0.05




lnCBA: POST‐UMP 66.434 (2.14)** 182.722 (1.11) −122.541 (−0.93)
AGS: POST‐UMP −212.967 (−1.97)** −857.729 (−1.52) 582.418 (0.92)
∆
∼
lnCBA: POST‐TAPER −283.673 (−1.11)
AGS: POST‐TAPER 1,739.077 (1.34)
LAGFLOW 0.700 (5.09)*** 0.254 (10.08)*** 0.547 (2.51)**
ΔVIX −109.939 (−1.48) −165.326 (−1.22) −122.483 (−1.73)*
ΔTEDSPREAD 814.827 (1.54) 2,348.041 (5.11)*** 1,130.589 (3.41)***
EPU 0.711 (0.90) −1.055 (−0.57) −6.417 (−0.61)
Region effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 339 111 270
R2 0.325 0.305 0.326
21
We estimate a model such as in Equation (3) for the ECB and BoJ. For the Fed, the model includes an interaction effect with an indicator variable that
denotes the start of tapering operations by the Fed in June 2013. Thus, the model estimated for the Fed is akin to that in Equation (4) where the indicator
variable now equals 1 for the period after June 2013 and is equal to zero for the period October 2008–May 2013.
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spillover effects from ECB asset growth and negative effects from ECB AGS. There is no evidence of
spillover effects from the BoJ. Finally, the results from the three EM‐region sample (Table 9) reinforce
the significant spillover effects from Fed asset growth and negative effects from Fed AGS. In sum,
the main conclusions from our hypotheses tests find strong supporting evidence from a restricted
sample that includes only the period of UMP operations by the three central banks.
5.5 | Robustness tests
We conducted several checks on the robustness of our results. First, along with other studies in-
cluding Lim andMohapatra (2016) and Koepke (2018), our dependent variable is measured as capital
flows to EMs in absolute (dollar) amount. Several studies measure capital flows in relation to
economic size (GDP) (e.g., Chari et al., 2020) or assets under management of receiving country (e.g.,
Li et al., 2018). We have chosen the absolute amount of capital flows for two reasons. Our basic
hypotheses relate to how the expansion of central bank assets influences global liquidity and its
concomitant effects on EM capital flows. We believe a measure of absolute (dollar) flows is closer to
the spirit of the global liquidity hypothesis. Second, the fixed‐effects estimation method captures
idiosyncratic country effects such as differences in economic size. Nonetheless, we conducted a
robustness check with FLOW/GDP as our dependent variable and the results are similar (all
robustness check results are available upon request).
Second, we use alternative criteria to choose the autoregressive lag length in Equation (2).
Instead of the AIC criterion, we use (i) the Schwarz Bayesian Information, (ii) the same lag
length and (3) for all central banks. The results are qualitatively identical and quantitatively
very similar. Third, in the estimation of the model for the 16‐country sample, we included two
additional domestic (pull) control variables: The domestic discount rate and the rate of ap-
preciation/depreciation of the domestic currency. The discount rate is an indicator of domestic
monetary conditions in place of market‐based short‐term interest rates that are not available for
most EMs for the sample duration. The rate of domestic currency appreciation/depreciation is
measured as the logarithmic first difference of the nominal effective exchange rate of each
EM.22 As a global variable, we considered a global economic policy uncertainty index in place
of the specific policy uncertainty indicators. The results are qualitatively the same and quan-
titatively very similar to those reported in the text.
6 | SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The theme of this paper is the link between the monetary policies pursued by the major
central banks and flows of equity capital to EMs by global investment funds. This has
become an important topic in global finance following the onset of the financial crisis and
the adoption of unconventional policies by central banks. Focusing on capital flows by
investment funds, we examine how global investors respond to the central bank policies.
Specifically, we look at two aspects of monetary policy. First, the accumulation of assets
by central banks and the related hypothesis that the rapid rate of accumulation since the
advent of UMP has boosted global liquidity and that EM equity markets have been
22





recipients of the increased global liquidity as global investors sought higher returns. The
second aspect of monetary policy concerns surprises in the asset accumulation by central
banks.
We test these hypotheses with a monthly panel data set on equity capital flows by global
investment funds from April 1998 to March 2018. We work with two data sets, at the in-
dividual country and regional level. The length of time‐series data allows us to estimate the
differential effects of central bank policy before and after the adoption of unconventional
measures by the three banks. Thus, we are able to provide answers to the empirical questions
central to this paper.
Several conclusions emerge from our empirical analysis. First, global investors in EMs
respond to the monetary policy pursued by the Fed and to a lesser extent the ECB. There is
no evidence of capital flow responsiveness to the monetary policy of the BoJ. Second,
investor responsiveness concerns two aspects of central bank policy: (i) The accumulation
of assets by central banks, especially evident during the QE period through direct pur-
chases of government bonds and (ii) surprises to the growth of assets. Third, we test two
concomitant hypotheses: (i) higher central bank asset growth has spilled over into higher
net capital flows to EMs and (ii) greater surprises regarding the growth of central bank
assets have a negative effect on EMs capital flows. We find consistent support for both
hypotheses in the case of the Fed and the results are economically significant. This result
is conditioned on the inclusion of a general policy uncertainty index so that our measure
of AGS does not stand in for general policy uncertainty. The evidence on both hypotheses
for the ECB is mixed. Fourth, we document a heterogeneous pattern of spillover effects
across EM geographic regions: (i) positive effects from Fed and ECB asset growth post‐
UMP primarily towards Asia and (ii) Fed and ECB AGS negatively related to equity capital
flows to Asia and LA and the effect for Asia is larger. In summary, our paper shows that
unconventional monetary policies pursued by the Fed and to a lesser extent the ECB have
been significant factors in the allocation of equity capital flows to EMs by global invest-
ment funds.
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APPENDIX A1
Capital flows to individual countries ($ million)—Descriptive statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for net equity capital flows for each individual emerging
market included in the study.
Mean Median Standard deviation Maximum Minimum
Brazil 23.303 −2.940 380.462 2,045.480 −1,011.990
Chile 0.525 −0.010 26.634 183.310 −64.070
China −61.383 4.990 1,359.281 5,061.270 −8,316.960
Czech Republic −0.492 −0.035 11.295 51.450 −130.790
Egypt −0.745 −0.150 6.573 34.710 −40.930
India 183.835 5.580 630.587 3,513.370 −1,103.530
Indonesia −0.656 −0.905 80.728 516.800 −316.580
Malaysia −3.778 −1.275 72.956 496.750 −338.290
Mexico −32.543 −4.685 189.686 1,073.360 −722.380
Philippines 0.726 −0.240 29.435 271.890 −109.480
Russia 22.978 −0.305 349.518 1,440.330 −1,471.430
South Africa −5.762 −0.640 45.106 239.350 −196.350
South Korea 26.969 −0.895 461.384 3,567.330 −1,491.360
Taiwan −5.154 −3.625 366.875 3,279.020 −1,289.970
Thailand 2.153 −2.490 135.646 794.830 −412.300
Turkey 0.233 −0.040 80.026 539.780 −407.780
28 | EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
ANDREOU ET AL.
